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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new and efficient short
signature scheme from the bilinear pairings. Our scheme is
constructed by bilinear inverse-square Diffie-Hellman problem
(BISDHP) and does not require any special hash function. The
exact security proofs are also explained in the random Oracle
model. We give the implementation and comparison results
of our proposed signature scheme with the signature scheme
proposed by Boneh, Lynn, Shacham (BLS) and Zhang, Safavi,
Susilo (ZSS). Furthermore, we use this signature scheme to
construct a ring signature scheme.
Keywords—bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, bilinear pairings,
ring signature, short signature.
1. Introduction
Digital signatures are one of the most important crypto-
graphic primitive for the daily life. Short signatures are
needed in environments with space and bandwidth con-
straints. Up to pairing-based cryptography, the best known
shortest signature was obtained by using the digital sig-
nature algorithm (DSA) [1] over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq. The
length of the signature is approximately 2logq. On the
other hand, when the pairing-based cryptographic proto-
col is used the length of the signature is about ρ logr,
where ρ = logq/ logr and r is the largest prime divisor
of the number of the points in the elliptic curve. For exam-
ple, if one uses RSA signature 1024 bit modulus, the out-
put of elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)
is 320 bit long for the same security level. However, short
signature provides the same security level only for 160 bits
for the best choice.
In 2001 Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [2] proposed the idea
of short signature scheme by using bilinear pairings. This
scheme is based on Weil pairing and needs a special hash
function [2], [3], [4]. Over the last years, there are various
applications of bilinear pairings in short signature schemes
to construct new eﬃcient schemes [5], [6], [7]. The main
improvement in short signature schemes is the use of cryp-
tographic hash function such as MD5, SHA-1 [7] instead
of special hash function called MapToPoint hash opera-
tion. It is known that short signature scheme with cryp-
tographic hash function is more eﬃcient than others since
MapToPoint hash operation is still probabilistic.
In this study, we describe a new short signature scheme in
a similar setting in ZSS scheme [7]. Our system is based on
bilinear inverse-square Diﬃe-Hellman problem a combina-
tion of bilinear inverse Diﬃe-Hellman problem (BIDHP)
and bilinear square Diﬃe-Hellman problem (BSDHP). The
main advantage of our scheme is that it can be used with any
cryptographic hash function such as MD5, SHA-1. To give
the exact security proofs, we deﬁne a new problem called
inverse square problem with k traitors (k−ISP). Then, the
exact security proofs of proposed scheme are also explained
in the random Oracle model. We give the comparison of
our scheme with the BLS scheme and ZSS scheme. Ac-
cording to the comparison results, our scheme is more ef-
ﬁcient than BLS scheme.
Furthermore, based on new proposed signature scheme, we
construct a ring signature scheme.
This paper is organized as follows: Some preliminar-
ies about bilinear pairings and some related problems to
pairings are given in Section 2. Proposed short signature
scheme and its security analysis are explained in Section 3.
A construction of ring signature scheme is given in Sec-
tion 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Pairing-Based Cryptography
In this section, we give some facts about bilinear pairings
and deﬁne some new problems. The proposed short signa-
ture scheme uses bilinearity like others.
2.1. Bilinear Pairings
Definition 1: Let G1 and G2 be additive cyclic groups of
order n. Let G3 be a multiplicative cyclic group of order
n. A bilinear pairing is an eﬃciently computable map e :
G1 ×G2 −→ G3 which satisﬁes the following additional
properties:
1. (bilinearity) For all P,R ∈ G1 and all Q,S ∈ G2, we
have e(P + R,Q) = e(P,Q)e(R,Q) and e(P,Q+ S) =
e(P,Q)e(P,S).
2. (non-degeneracy) For all P∈G1, with P 6= IdG1 , there
is some Q ∈ G2 such that e(P,Q) 6= IdG3 . For all
Q ∈ G2, with Q 6= IdG2 , there is some P ∈ G1 such
that e(P,Q) 6= IdG3 . When G1 = G2 and n is prime,
e(P,P) is a generator of G3 for all P 6= IdG1
The following lemma which is related to the properties of
bilinear pairings can be easily veriﬁed.
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Lemma 1: Let e : G1×G2 −→G3 be a bilinear pairing. Let
P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2. Then
1. e(P, IdG2) = e(IdG1 ,Q) = IdG3
2. e(−P,Q) = e(P,−Q) = e(P,Q)−1
3. e(kP,Q) = e(P,kQ) = e(P,Q)k for all k ∈ Z.
4. e(kP, lP) = e(P,P)kl for all k, l ∈ Z.
2.2. Some Problems
We consider the following problems in the additive group
(G,+) of order n.
• Discrete logarithm problem (DLP): For P,Q ∈ G,
ﬁnd k ∈ Z∗n such that Q = kP whenever such k exists.
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For
a,b,c ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP,bP,cP decide whether c≡ ab
(mod n).
• Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP):
For a,b ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP,bP compute abP.
There are two variations of CDHP:
• Inverse computational Diffie-Hellman problem
(ICDHP): For a ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP, compute a−1P.
• Square computational Diffie-Hellman problem
(SCDHP): For a ∈ Z∗n, given P,aP, compute a2P.
The following theorem shows the relation of these problems
that the proof can be found in [8].
Theorem 1: CDHP, ICDHP and SCDHP are polynomial
time equivalent.
The security of some applications of bilinear pairings in
cryptography relies on the diﬃculty of bilinear Diﬃe-
Hellman problem (BDHP) which was ﬁrst stated in [4].
Definition 2: Let G be a ﬁnite additive cyclic group of or-
der n with a generator P, let e be a bilinear pairing on G,
and let a,b,c be integers. The BDHP is to compute the
value of the bilinear pairing e(abcP,P), whenever aP, bP
and cP are given.
The well known pairing-based protocols are three-party key
exchange in one round protocol proposed by Joux in [9],
identity-based encryption scheme by Boneh-Franklin in [4]
and short signature scheme by Boneh-Lynn-Shacham in [2]
that the security of them depends on the BDHP. There are
variants of BDHP:
• Bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem
(BIDHP): For a,b∈Z∗n, given P, aP, bP to compute
e(P,P)a−1b.
• Bilinear square Diffie-Hellman problem
(BSDHP): For a,b∈Z∗n, given P, aP, bP to compute
e(P,P)a2b.
It is not hard to obtain bilinear inverse-square Diﬃe-
Hellman Problem as a combination of BIDHP and BSDHP:
• Bilinear inverse-square Diffie-Hellman problem
(BISDHP): For a,b ∈ Z∗n, given P, aP, bP to com-
pute e(P,P)a−2b.
Theorem 2: BDHP, BIDHP, BSDHP and BISDHP are
polynomial time equivalent.
Proof:
BDHP ⇒ BIDHP is trivial.
BIDHP ⇒ BSDHP:
Given P,aP,bP, set the input of BIDHP as
Q = aP, Q1 = P = a−1Q, Q2 = bP = ba−1Q,
then BIDHP outputs
e(Q1,Q2) = e(Q,Q)(a−1)−1ba−1 = e(aP,aP)b = e(P,P)a2b
BSDHP ⇒ BISDHP:
Given P,a2P,bP, set the input of BSDHP as
Q = a2P, Q1 = a−2Q = P, Q2 = a−2bQ = bP,
then BSDHP outputs
e(Q1,Q2) = e(Q,Q)(a−2)2ba−2 = e(P,P)a−2b
BISDHP ⇒ BDHP:
Given P,aP,bP,cP, set the input of BSDHP as the triples
(P,aP,cP), (P,bP,cP), (P,aP+ bP,cP),
then we have e(P,P)a−2c, e(P,P)b−2c and e(P,P)(a+b)−2c,
respectively. Therefore, we obtain
e(P,P)abc =
(
e(P,P)a−2c·e(P,P)b−2c
e(P,P)(a+b)−2c
)1/2
.

3. New Short Signature Scheme From
Bilinear Pairings
In this section, we propose our signature scheme, and then
explain its security. Moreover, we compare our scheme
with BLS and ZSS schemes from the implementation point
of view.
3.1. Signature Scheme
A signature scheme consists of four steps: a parameter gen-
eration algorithm ParamGen, a key generation algorithm
KeyGen, a signature generation algorithm Sign and a sig-
nature veriﬁcation algorithm Verify.
We describe the new signature scheme as follows:
Let (G1,+) and (G2, ·) be cyclic groups of prime order n,
P ∈ G1, G1 =< P > and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear
map. Let H : Z∞2 → Zλ2 , where 160≤ λ ≤ log(n) be a cryp-
tographic hash function such as SHA1 or MD5. Suppose
that A wants to send a signed message to B.
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• ParamGen: {G1,G2,e,n,P,H}
• KeyGen: A randomly selects x ∈ Zn and computes
Ppub1 = x2P and Ppub2 = 2xP. In this structure, P,
Ppub1 and Ppub2 are the public keys, x is the secret key.
• Sign: Given a secret key x and a message m, A com-
putes the signature, s = (H(m)+ x)−2P.
• Verify: Given the public keys P, Ppub1 and Ppub2,
a message m and a signature s, B veriﬁes the sig-
nature if
e(H(m)2P+ Ppub1 + Ppub2H(m),s) = e(P,P) holds.
The veriﬁcation is done by using bilinearity in the following
equations:
e((H(m)+ x)2P,(H(m)+ x)−2P) =
e(P,P)(H(m)+x)2(H(m)+x)−2 = e(P,P).
3.2. Signature Security
The well-known attacks against signature schemes are with-
out message attack and chosen-message attack. The stron-
gest version of these attacks is an adaptive chosen-message
attack. In this scenario, the attacker can ask the signer to
sign any message that he/she chooses. He also knows the
public key of the signer. Then, he can customize his queries
according to the previous message and chosen signature
pairs.
The strongest notion of security for signature schemes
that is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-
message attack was deﬁned by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rivest [10]. Here, we use the deﬁnition of exact secure
signature schemes by Bellare and Rogaway [11] stated as
follows:
Definition 3: A signature scheme S, deﬁned by S =
< ParamGen,KeyGen,Sign,Verify >, is (t,qH ,qS,ε)-
existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message
attack if for every probabilistic polynomial time forger al-
gorithm F running in t processing time, at most qH queries
to the hash oracle and qS signatures queries, there does not
exist a non-negligible probability ε .
A signature scheme S is (t,qH ,qS,ε)-secure if there is no
forger who (t,qH ,qS,ε) breaks the scheme.
We introduce a new problem that was called k-ISP (inverse
square problem with k traitors) to give the security proof
of the new signature scheme. This problem is similar to
k-CAA (collusion attack algorithm with k traitors) that was
proposed by Mitsunari, Sakai and Kasahara in [12].
Definition 4: (k-ISP) For an integer k, and x ∈ Zn, P ∈G1,
given
{P,xP,H1,H2, · · · ,Hk,(H1 + x)−2P,(H2 + x)−2P, · · · ,(Hk +
x)−2P},
compute (H + x)−2P for some H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,Hk}.
k-ISP is (t,ε)-hard if for any t-time adversaries A, we have
Pr


A
(
P,xP,H1,H2, · · · ,Hk,(H1 +x)−2P,(H2 +x)−2P, · · · ,
(Hk +x)−2P)|x ∈ Zn,P ∈G1,H1,H2, · · · ,Hk ∈ Zn
)
= (H +x)−2P,H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,Hk}

< ε
where ε is negligible.
The following theorem shows that proposed signature
scheme is secure against the adaptive chosen-message at-
tack.
Theorem 3: If there exists a (t,qH ,qS,ε)-forger F us-
ing an adaptive chosen message attack for the signa-
ture scheme proposed in Section 3.1, then there exists
a (t
′
,ε
′
)-algorithm A solving qS − ISP, where t
′
= t and
ε
′
≥ ( qSqH )
qS · ε .
Proof: Assume that the output of the hash function is uni-
formly distributed and the hash oracle will give a correct
response for any hash query.
Suppose that a forger F (t,qH ,qS,ε)-break the signa-
ture scheme using an adaptive chosen message attack.
One needs an algorithm A to solve qs − ISP. In this
structure, the challenge is to compute (H + x)−2P for
some H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,Hk} for given P ∈ G1, Ppub1 =
x2P, Ppub2 = 2xP, H1,H2, · · · ,Hqs ∈ Zn and (H1 + x)−2P,
(H2 + x)−2P, · · · ,(Hqs + x)−2P
A is the signer and answers hash and signing queries by
itself. Algorithm is as follows:
Step 1: {H1,H2, · · · ,HqH} are the responses of the
hash oracle queries for the corresponding messages
{m1,m2, · · · ,mqH}.
Step 2: F makes a signature oracle query for each Hi for
1 ≤ i ≤ qH . If the hash oracle answers truely, A returns
(Hi + x)−2P to F as the response. Otherwise, the process
stops.
Step 3: F outputs a message-signature pair (m,S). The
hash value of m is some H and H /∈ {H1,H2, · · · ,HqH}. It
satisﬁes:
e(x2P + 2xP+ H2P,S) = e(P,P)
So, S = (H + x)−2P. A outputs (H,S) as a solution of
challenge.
Since the operations are the same for A and F, the running
time of A and F is equal, t = t
′
. The success probability
of A is qSqH is Step 2. A will not fail with probability
p≥ ( qSqH )
qS . Then, the success probability of the algorithm,
A for all steps is ε
′
≥ ( qSqH )
qS ·ε . This completes the proof.

Note that, one can obtain a good bound if qS and qH are
very closed.
We now recall k-weak computational Diﬃe-Hellman prob-
lem (k-wCDHP) proposed by Mitsunari et. al [12].
Definition 5: (k-wCDHP ) For an integer k, and x,H ∈ Zn,
P ∈G1, given k + 1 values
{P,(H + x)P,(H + x)2P, · · · ,(H + x)kP},
compute (H + x)−1P.
We deﬁne a new problem that is called k + 1 inverse ex-
ponent problem (k+1-IEP) to give a speciﬁc evaluation of
the security of our proposed signature scheme.
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Definition 6: (k+1-IEP) For an integer k, and a ∈ Zn, P ∈
G1, given k + 1 values
{P,aP,a−2P, · · · ,a−kP},
compute a−(k+1)P.
Theorem 4: k-wCDHP and k+1-IEP are polynomial time
equivalent.
Proof:
k-wCDHP ⇒ k+1-IEP:
Given k + 1 values P,(H + x)−1P,(H + x)−2P, · · · ,(H +
x)−kP, let Q = (H + x)−kP, tQ = (H + x)−(k−1)P, and so
t = (H + x).
Set the input of k-wCDHP to be
(H + x)−kP = Q, (H + x)−(k−1)P = tQ,
(H + x)−(k−2)P = t2Q, · · · ,
(H + x)−1P = tk−1Q, P = tkQ.
Then, k-wCDHP outputs
t−1Q = (H + x)−1(H + x)−kP = (H + x)−(k+1).
k+1-IEP ⇒ k-wCDHP:
Given k+1 values P,(H +x)P,(H +x)2P, · · · ,(H +x)kP, let
Q = (H + x)kP, t−1Q = (H + x)(k−1)P, and so t = (H + x).
Set the input of k+1-IEP to be
(H + x)kP = Q, (H + x)(k−1)P = t−1Q,
(H + x)(k−2)P = t−2Q, · · · ,
(H + x)P = t−(k−1)Q, P = t−kQ.
Then, k+1-IEP outputs
t−(k+1)Q = (H + x)−1P.

We note that k+1-IEP and k-wCDHP are no harder
than the CDHP. There is a special case that k+1-IEP or
k-wCDHP can be easily solved :
Given
P0 = P, P1 = (H + x)−1P, P2 = (H + x)−2P, · · · ,
P(k−1) = (H + x)−(k−1)P, Pk = (H + x)−kP,
if Pi = Pj for i 6= j, this means that (H +x)−iP≡ (H +x)− jP
(mod q), so the order of (H + x) in Zq is j− i. Then,
(H + x)−1P = Pj−i−1 or (H + x)k+1P = Pk+1 mod ( j−i).
This case gives an attack on our proposed signature scheme.
However, because of considering (H + x) as a random el-
ement in Z∗q, we can show that the success probability of
this attack is negligible.
Let q be a prime. Then, for any a ∈ Z∗q, the order of a,
ord(a), is a divisor of q−1. Given k > 1, assume that the
number of element a ∈ Z∗q such that ord(a) ≤ k is given
by N. Since Zq is a ﬁeld, N < k2 for k > 1. Let ρ be
the probability that a randomly chosen element in Z∗q has
order less than k, then
ρ = N
q
<
k2
q
.
This gives us an opportunity to give a bound on k, such as,
if q≈ 2256, we limit k≤ 264, which means that the attacker
has at most 264 message-signature pairs. Therefore, using
the above attack, the success probability is
(264)2
2256
= 2−128 ·0.29387 ·10−38.
As a result, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Assume that there is no polynomial time al-
gorithm to solve the problem k+1-IEP with non-negligible
probability, then the proposed signature scheme is secure
under the random Oracle model.
3.3. Efficiency
We compare our signature scheme with the BLS scheme
and ZSS scheme from the implementation point of view.
PO, SM, PA, Squ, Inv, MT P and H denote the pairing op-
eration, scalar multiplication in G1, point addition in G1,
squaring in Zn, inversion in Zn, MapToPoint hash opera-
tion and hash operation in Zn, respectively. In the light of
above, Table 1 summarizes the result.
Table 1
Comparison of our scheme with the BLS scheme
and ZSS scheme
Scheme BLS ZSS Proposed
Key generation 1 SM 1 SM 2 SM
1 MT P 1 H 1 H
Signing 1 SM 1 Inv 1 Inv
1 SM 1 SM
1 Squ
1 MT P 1 H 1 H
2 PO 1 SM 1 SM
Veriﬁcation 1 PO 1 PO
2 PA
1 Squ
We implemented proposed signature scheme by using
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library [13] and The
GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) [14].
Both libraries are installed as default installation. We run
Cygwin as Linux simulator for GMP. The performance of
signature schemas was measured on an Intel Core Duo
Table 2
Time comparison of our scheme with the BLS scheme
and ZSS scheme
Scheme BLS ZSS Proposed
All time including:
key generation, 0.171000 0.098000 0.101000
signing, veriﬁcation [s]
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1.6 GHz with 2 GB RAM, running Windows XP SP2. We
have used standard functions of GMP 4.2.1/PBC 0.4.18
and compiled by GNU C Compiler. It should be noted that
computation of pairing is the most time-consuming part in
short signature schemes. According to the implementation
result given in Table 2, our new scheme is more eﬃcient
than BLS scheme since it requires less pairing operation.
4. A Ring Signature Scheme
Ring signature schemes were proposed in [15]. Main
purpose of a ring signature is to provide anonymity for the
signer, by making it impossible to determine who among
the possible signers is the actual one. By this way, the sig-
nature provides anonymity for the signer. Ring signature
schemes satisfy signer ambiguity and security against an
adaptive chosen message attack. A ring signature scheme
is deﬁned by:
• ring signing (m,P1,P2, · · · ,Pr,xi) produces a ring
signature σ for the message m and a ring with r
members, given the public keys P1,P2, · · · ,Pr together
with secret key of the signer xi.
• ring verifying a signature pair (m,σ) includes the
public keys of all the ring members i.e. possible
signers.
The system parameters are {G1,G2,e,n,r,P,H} which are
deﬁned in Section 3.1.
• Sign: Assume that the ith member of the ring sign
the message. Let the public keys of the ring members
be Ppub1 j and Ppub2 j, the secret key of the signer be xi.
Then,
Si = (H(m)+ xi)−2P+(H(m)
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
2x jP
+
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
(x2jP+ H(m)2P))
• Verify:
r
∏
j=1
e((H(m)+ x j)2P,Si) = e(P,P).
Proof:
r
∏
j=1
e((H(m)+ x j)2P,Si)
= e(
r
∑
j=1
(H(m)+ x2j)P,Si)
= e(
r
∑
j=1
(H(m)+ x2j)P,(H(m)+ xi)
−2P
+ (H(m)
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
2x jP +
r−1
∑
j=1,i6= j
(x2jP+ H(m)
2P))
= e(P,P).

The security of the proposed ring signature scheme is simi-
lar as given in Section 3.2 since it is based on the signature
scheme described in Section 3.1.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new short signature scheme not
requiring any special hash function. The security of this
signature scheme depends on a new problem called bilin-
ear inverse-square Diﬃe-Hellman problem (BISDHP). It is
shown that this problem and BDHP are polynomial time
equivalent. We also propose a new complexity assumption
called the k +1 inverse exponent problem. The exact secu-
rity proofs are also explained in the random Oracle model.
We give the implementation and comparison results of our
proposed signature scheme with the BLS and ZSS schemes.
According to the implementation results, our new scheme
is more eﬃcient than BLS scheme since it requires less
pairing operation. Finally, we construct a ring signature
scheme based on our proposed scheme.
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